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Abstract of the Thesis
Learning from Past Conflict: Investigating the Time Scale of Conflict Learning for Cognitive
Control Processes
by
Abhishek Dey
Master of Arts in Cognitive Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Professor Julie Bugg, Chair

Conflict-modulated cognitive control accounts posit that control processes adjust attention based
on the probability of conflict associated with a given context (e.g., list of items, a particular item
within a list, etc.). However, within these accounts, it is not yet fully understood how the control
system learns about the probability of conflict. A specific question I address in the present
research is how far back does the control system look to learn about the probability of conflict?
In other words, what is the time scale of conflict learning for the control system? I use a
statistical model recently developed by Aben et al. (2017) that captured the time scale of conflict
learning for list-level control processes in a flanker task. The set of analyses I present shows that
this model reliably captures the time scale of conflict learning for task-general, list-level control
processes (Analysis 1 and Analysis 2). In addition, I also demonstrate that there are no
differences in the time scale of conflict learning for differentially conflicting items within a list
which are thought to engage item-level control (Analysis 3 and Analysis 4). I discuss potential
reasons for the time scale patterns and the implications they may have for extant theories of
cognitive control.

viii

Introduction

Cognitive control, or attentional control, can be thought of as the ability to pursue goaldirected behavior in the face of more habitual or immediately compelling alternative behaviors
(Cohen 2017). Cognitive control is often driven by changes in the probability of conflict in a
given context (e.g., Bugg, 2014; Bugg, Jacoby, & Chanani, 2011; Crump, Gong, & Milliken,
2006; Jacoby, Lindsay, & Hessels, 2003; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). Conflict occurs when the
relevant (to-be-attended) and irrelevant (to-be-ignored) stimulus dimensions trigger competing
cognitive representations or response options. The term context-driven control implies that the
control system learns about the probability of conflict within a given context and transforms that
information into a signal that modulates attention appropriately (i.e., to match the probability).
For example, imagine a student is attending two lecture classes that are held in different
classrooms in the same building. In one class noise from construction intermittently interrupts
class. The other class is not interrupted by noise. At the beginning of the semester, the student’s
ability to attend to the lecture may be impaired in the class with construction noise relative to the
class with no noise. However, as a function of the control system learning over the course of the
semester, the control system may continuously heighten attention towards the lecture and filter
out distraction (e.g., noise) when in the classroom in which there is a high probability of noise. In
comparison, in the class in which there are rarely any interruptions, the control system may not
heighten attention in this fashion. Consequently, the student may find it easier to pay attention to
the lecture in the classroom with the construction noise. This context-driven allocation of
attention on a classroom-by-classroom basis demonstrates how the control system learns the
statistical regularities of conflict based on accumulating experiences within a context (e.g., the
1

probability of conflict), and transforms the learned information to produce a signal that heightens
attention settings for one class and not the other.
Several mechanistic models of cognitive control have been developed to explain how the
control system modulates attention settings. In this paper, I focus on the many models that
assume that the signal for control adjustment is conflict. These include (but are not limited to)
the conflict-monitoring hypothesis (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, Cohen, 2001), the itemspecific adaptation and conflict-monitoring hypothesis (Blais, Robidoux, Risko, & Besner,
2007), and the dual mechanisms of control account (De Pisapia & Braver, 2006). These models
all agree that past experiences of conflict are central to how the system modulates attention
settings. In addition, a strong interpretation of these models assumes that there is a task-general
control system as opposed to task-specific control systems. As an everyday example, these
models would imply that there is a single control system responsible for modulating attention to
lectures in class and to the road when driving; in the laboratory, the implication is that there is a
single control system for modulating attention to distractors in a flanker task and in a Stroop
task. One outstanding question that remains within these accounts is how the control system
learns about statistical regularities of conflict. Specifically, what is the time scale under which a
conflict learning mechanism operates? Here, a conflict learning mechanism can be thought of as
a conflict accumulator, that is, a mechanism that stores and represents prior instances of conflict.
Time scale refers to how many prior trials are tracked by the accumulator. In reference to the
earlier example, does the student’s conflict accumulator aggregate conflict information across the
whole semester (long time scale), or does the accumulator aggregate conflict information across
just a few previous days (short time scale).

2

In an attempt to tackle the above outstanding question, Aben, Verguts and Van den
Bussche (2017) recently developed a statistical model to quantify the time scale of conflict
learning for contexts with differing probabilities of conflict. But, before I describe the model and
results from Aben et al., I will provide some background that will serve as a foundation for
understanding their results and for understanding the motivation behind the present research.
First, I will begin by detailing a way that we can manipulate the global probability of conflict
(i.e., proportion congruence) and I will describe a behavioral pattern that result as a function of
this manipulation (i.e., the proportion congruence effect). This behavioral pattern serve as an
initial motivator for examining potential differences in the time scale of conflict learning
between contexts. Second, I will describe a way that we can manipulate probability of conflict
for a given item and the behavioral pattern that result from such a manipulation. This will serve
as motivation for examining time scale differences as a function of probability of conflict for
items within a context.
Proportion Congruence Effects

In attention demanding tasks like Stroop, flanker, and Simon tasks, the congruency effect
is the observation that participants are faster to respond to, and are sometimes more accurate on,
congruent trials as compared to incongruent trials. For example, in color-word Stroop where
participants name the ink color of color words, this is reflected in faster reaction times (RT) and
higher accuracy for congruent stimuli (e.g., the word matches the color blue) compared to
incongruent stimuli (e.g., the word GREEN conflicts with the color blue). Critically for present
purposes, the congruency effect systematically varies as a function of global probability of
conflict within a context. When the probability of conflict is low, as in a mostly congruent list,
3

the congruency effect is larger than when the probability of conflict is high, as in a mostly
incongruent list (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). This robust behavioral pattern is termed the
proportion congruence effect (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Logan,
Zbrodoff, & Williamson, 1984; Lowe & Mitterer, 1982). The prevailing interpretation of this
pattern is that the control system learns about the statistical regularities of conflict within a list
and biases attention settings based on those regularities (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994; Logan &
Zbrodoff, 1979; Lowe & Mitterer, 1982; Tzelgov, Henik, & Berger, 1992). A mostly congruent
list is associated with a setting that processes the word to a greater extent than the setting
associated with the mostly incongruent list (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994; cf. Melara & Algom,
2003), in which attention to color may also be amplified (Egner & Hirsch, 2005). A natural
question that follows from this interpretation, and a primary one this present research seeks to
address, is how far back does the control system look to learn about the probability of conflict
within a given list context? In other words, what is the time scale of conflict learning? As an
exaggerated example, when reaching the 100th item in a Stroop list, has the conflict learning
mechanism accumulated information from all previous 99 items? Or, is there a restricted range
for accumulation such that only a few previous trials are aggregated to calculate probability of
conflict, and thereby modulate attention? Moreover, does the time scale of conflict learning
systematically vary as a function of global probability of conflict? That is, is there a difference
in time scales between mostly congruent (low probability of conflict) and mostly incongruent
(high probability conflict) contexts?

4

Conflict Learning at Multiple Levels of Control

A point to consider for developing models of the conflict learning mechanism is that
conflict learning can occur at multiple levels. To make a coarse distinction, control can be
applied globally across the whole context, or locally for items within a context. In the previous
section, I described proportion congruence effects, but of a particular kind – list-wide proportion
congruence effects. To reiterate, one account of this effect is that the control system learns about
the global probability of conflict associated with an entire list. Because the probability of
conflict of the list guides attention, control is thought to operate at the list-level (Bugg, 2014;
Bugg & Chanani, 2011; Hutchison, 2011; Gonthier, Braver, & Bugg, 2016). However, with
traditional list-wide proportion congruence manipulations, items within a list have item-specific
proportion congruences that match the list-wide proportion congruence. That is, a color-word
Stroop list with a proportion congruence of .75 (PC 75) is made up of items that are also PC 75.
In other words, the color green is congruent on 75% of trials, as is the color blue, etc. Thus, an
alternative account of list-wide proportion congruence effects is that the system learns about the
probability of conflict for items within a list and guides attention using item-level control (Blais
& Bunge, 2010; Blais et al., 2007). A way to adjudicate between these two accounts makes use
of additional items termed transfer items. Transfer items are items that have an overall
proportion congruence of .50 (PC 50). These items are embedded within mostly congruent and
mostly incongruent lists. List-level control is demonstrated when PC 50 transfer items within a
mostly congruent list have larger Stroop effects than the same PC 50 transfer items within mostly
incongruent lists (see Bugg, 2014; Gonthier et al., 2016; Bugg & Chanani, 2011; see also
Hutchison, 2011, for the same pattern with PC matched transfer items that were not 50%
congruent).
5

While it is now clear that list-level control can be observed independent of item-level
control, behavioral evidence also clearly demonstrates that item-level control can be observed
independent of list-level control in certain contexts. Jacoby, Lindsay, and Hessels (2003) found
that mostly congruent items within a list produced larger Stroop effects than mostly incongruent
items within the same list, a pattern known as an item-specific proportion congruence effect.
Importantly, these items were intermixed such that the list itself was PC 50. This effect has since
been observed after controlling for contingency confounds in Stroop and flanker tasks (e.g.,
Bugg, 2015; Bugg & Dey, 2018; Bugg & Hutchison, 2013; Bugg, Jacoby, & Chanani, 2011;
Chiu, Jiang, & Egner, 2017; for role of contingency learning, see Schmidt & Besner, 2008),
demonstrating modulations of attention on an item-by-item basis. Because attention can be
modulated for items within a list, the same questions regarding the time scale of conflict learning
for list-level control can also be asked for item-level control. Namely, how long is the time scale
of conflict learning for item-level control, and does the time scale vary systematically for mostly
congruent and mostly incongruent items?
A framework which makes explicit the differences between item-level control and listlevel control is the dual mechanisms of control account (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; see also
Bugg, 2012; Bugg, 2017). The dual mechanisms of control account states that there are two
separable control mechanisms – proactive control and reactive control. List-level control is
thought to be proactive and is a tonic/sustained mechanism that does not fluctuate substantially
trial-by-trial. As it relates to the previous discussion of transfer (PC 50) items; the reason
differing congruency effects are observed for transfer items between mostly congruent and
mostly incongruent lists is because a sustained attentional state based on the global probability of
conflict for a list is utilized. In contrast, item-level control is thought to be a phasic/transient
6

mechanism such that a transient attentional state based on the probability of conflict for a given
item is utilized. Because mostly congruent and mostly incongruent items are intermixed within a
list, there is no way that the system can prepare in advance for an item. Thus, any control
adjustments that are observed must arise after the item is presented.
Based on the dual-mechanisms of control account, proactive sustained control would be
predicted to have a long time scale of conflict learning and reactive transient control would be
predicted to have a short time scale of conflict learning. Following these predictions, in the
present research I ought to observe long time scales for list-level control and short time scales for
item-level control if they reflect proactive and reactive control mechanisms, respectively.
However, an important finding as it relates to the dual mechanism of control account is that
although both list-wide mostly congruent and list-wide mostly incongruent manipulations
parametrically change conflict levels across the entire list, list-wide mostly congruent
manipulations result in behavioral and neuropsychological markers that are more consistent with
reactive control mechanisms and list-wide mostly incongruent manipulations result in markers
that are more consistent with proactive control mechanisms (De Pisapia & Braver, 2006). Given
these findings, the predictions would be that list-wide mostly incongruent manipulations lead to
long time scales of conflict learning, whereas both list-wide mostly congruent and item-level
control lead to short time scales of conflict learning.
I have thus far provided a brief summary of the relevant background literature that
motivated my inquiry into the time scale of conflict learning. I have also made explicit
predictions regarding the relative time scales of conflict learning for different types of control.
In the next section I will describe a novel method used to quantify the time scale of conflict
learning developed by Aben et al. (2017). The statistical model they used is central to the
7

present research as I used their exact modeling procedure in Analysis 1 and 2 and but modified
the model for Analysis 3 and 4.
Quantifying the Time Scale of Conflict Learning

To fully appreciate the model developed by Aben and colleagues (2017), I will briefly
describe another behavioral indicator of cognitive control that the authors leveraged – the
congruency sequence effect (CSE). There has been much literature demonstrating that the
congruency effect (i.e., the difference in reaction time between congruent and incongruent trials)
is subject to cross-trial sequence effects such that conflict on the previous trial (Ci-1;) influences
the degree to which conflict on the current trial (Ci) affects RT and accuracy (Gratton, Coles, &
Donchin, 1992; for reviews, see Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014;
Egner, 2007). The impact of Ci-1 on Ci (i.e, the CiCi-1 interaction) is termed the congruency
sequence effect (CSE). Figure 1 depicts the typical pattern for the CSE whereby the congruency
effect is reduced following a previous trial that is incongruent compared to one that is congruent.
One prominent interpretation of the CSE is that it reflects local adjustments of attention
by the control system based on the detection of conflict (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, &
Cohen, 2001). That is, based on the conflict status of the previous trial, the system adjusts
attention to the next trial. When encountering conflict on trial i-1, the control system relatively
increases attention to the relevant stimulus dimension reducing the congruency effect for the
current trial. Of primary interest for present purposes, Aben et al. (2017) recently examined an
extension of the CSE in which they looked not just at the impact of the congruency state of the
first previous trial on the current trial, but also the independent effect of multiple previous trials
on the congruency effect of the current trial. In other words, they looked at the independent
8

effect of Ci-1, Ci-2, Ci-3, ….. Ci-k on Ci. Here, k is equal to the maximum trial distance that had a
significant impact on the current trial. The primary parameters of interest were the current trial x
previous trial interactions (e.g., CiCi-1, CiCi-2, ….. CiCi-k). In this model, the value of an
interaction term for a given trial distance is deemed to be that trial distance’s conflict-adaptationweight (CAW). That is, the CAW for a given trial distance quantifies that trial distance’s
independent impact on the current trial’s congruency effect. In addition, the relative change in
CAWs across trial distances (slopes in Figure 2) is interpreted as an index of the time scale of
conflict learning. A long time scale is indexed by CAWs that do not change much over trial
distance, whereas a short time scale is indexed by CAWs that change more dramatically over
trial distance. A long time scale is reflective of a reduced learning rate of conflict. Essentially, it
translates to a relative decrease in the weighting of recent trials and a relative increase in the
weighting of distal trials when compared to a short time scale. Figure 2 (from Aben et al., 2017)
illustrates the difference between long and short time scales as captured by their model.
Henceforth I will refer to their model as the extended-CSE model.
Aben et al. (2017) used the extended-CSE model to quantify differences in the time scale
of conflict learning between four different list-wide manipulations in a flanker task. The four listwide manipulations were as follows – 1) list-wide mostly congruent, 2) list-wide mostly
incongruent, 3) neutral, and 4) volatile. The mostly congruent list was PC 80, the mostly
incongruent list was PC 20, the neutral list was PC 50, and the volatile list was also PC 50. The
key difference between the neutral list and volatile list was that the PC of the volatile list shifted
between PC 80 and PC 20 every 20 trials. Each list was 160 trials long. Based on the dual
mechanisms of control account, and consistent with the predictions made in the present research,
the authors predicted that the list-wide mostly incongruent manipulation would result in a long
9

time scale of conflict learning. In contrast, the list-wide mostly congruent manipulation was
predicted to result in a short time scale of conflict learning. In addition, they predicted that the
volatile list would result in a short time scale of conflict learning as there has been evidence
showing that the conflict learning rate increases as probability of conflict changes rapidly across
a list (Beherens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007; Jiang, Heller, & Egner, 2014).
The Extended-CSE Modeling Procedure

In this section I will describe the extended-CSE model in more detail. To reiterate, in the
extended-CSE model the interaction terms from the statistical model (CAWs) are interpreted as
indexes of how much the first previous through kth previous trial impacted the current trial’s
congruency effect. If there was a significant effect, then that trial was included as part of the
window size for conflict accumulation. In order to determine a suitable window size for their
time scale analysis, Aben and colleagues (2017) first chose a starting value of 14 for k. The
authors then ran a linear mixed effects model (nested within subjects), across the entire sample
and collapsing across lists, with RT as the dependent measure. The predictors were the
congruency state of the current trial, Ci, (0 – congruent, 1 – incongruent), the congruency state of
the first previous trial up to the 14th previous trial, Ci-1, Ci-2, ….. Ci-14, and the interactions
between current trial congruency and preceding trial congruency, CiCi-1, CiCi-2, ….. CiCi-14. By
running this model, they were able to determine how many trials back they should include to
quantify the time scale of control for each condition. They found that the previous 12 trials had
significant or close to significant interaction terms.
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Using k = 12 for their time scale analysis, Aben and colleagues (2017) analyzed RTs at
two levels. The first level used linear models for each subject in each condition to extract the
interaction coefficients from the following equation:

At the second level, they extracted the coefficients of the interaction terms and used those
coefficients as dependent variables with log trial distance and condition as predictors. Consistent
with their predictions, the authors found that the list-wide mostly congruent and volatile list
conditions produced a shorter time scale of conflict learning relative to list-wide mostly
incongruent and neutral list conditions. That is, list-wide mostly congruent and volatile
conditions induced more rapid changes with more recent incongruent trials dominating CAWs,
whereas list-wide mostly incongruent and neutral conditions showed slower and more steady
changes in CAWs across trial distance. An interpretation of these results is that the conflict
learning system in list-wide mostly congruent and volatile conditions utilizes fewer trials to
make control adjustments relative to list-wide mostly incongruent and neutral conditions.
Focusing just on the list-wide mostly congruent and list-wide mostly incongruent conditions, this
is consistent with the predictions that fall out of the dual mechanisms of control account which
states that reactive control (list-wide mostly congruent) ought to produce a short time scale and
proactive control (list-wide mostly incongruent) ought to produce a long time scale.
Present Study

Motivated by the results from Aben et al. (2017), in the present research, I attempted to
replicate the pattern they observed and extend their findings in two important ways. To
replicate, I used a data set from a picture-word Stroop task from Gonthier, Braver, and Bugg
11

(2016). I chose to use data from the Gonthier et al. study because the design revealed list-level
control. Specifically, the data showed that PC 50 transfer items within a mostly congruent list
had larger Stroop effects than PC 50 transfer items within a mostly incongruent list. I applied the
extended CSE-model to this data and investigated whether the time scale of conflict learning
varies systematically based on global probability of conflict between lists (Analysis 1). To
follow up, the two extensions I made were as follows. First, I investigated how generalizable the
list-level time scale pattern is across different control demanding tasks. I applied the extendedCSE model to a different data set that used a color-word Stroop task from Gourley, Braver, and
Bugg (2016) (Analysis 2). Similar to Gonthier et al., the design revealed list-level control as PC
50 transfer items within a mostly congruent list had larger Stroop effects than PC 50 transfer
items within a mostly incongruent list. For the second extension, I sought to determine if this
method of quantifying the time scale of conflict learning could be applied to items within a list
requiring item-level control (Analysis 3 and 4). The data used for Analysis 3 and 4 revealed
item-level control by showing larger Stroop effects for mostly congruent compared to mostly
incongruent items within the same list. The main prediction for item-level control is that the
time scale of conflict learning ought to be short because it relies on reactive control processes.
However, in addition, I sought to investigate whether items within the same list context may
produce systematic differences in their time scales of control depending on the item’s proportion
congruence.

12

Analysis 1: Examining the List-Wide Time Scale of Conflict Learning in a Picture-Word
Stroop Task from Gonthier et al. (2016)
Method

In Gonthier et al. (2016) each participant was exposed to three conditions. They
comprised of a list-wide mostly congruent condition, a list-wide mostly incongruent condition,
and a list-wide PC 50 condition. All three conditions included four PC 50 picture items. What
differed across conditions was the PC of the other four picture items included in each list. In the
list-wide mostly congruent condition, the other four were PC75. This led to an overall PC 67 list.
In the list-wide mostly incongruent condition, the other four were PC 25.1 This created an overall
PC 33 list. The list-wide mostly congruent and incongruent conditions were comprised of 384
trials. For the third condition, the list-wide PC 50 condition, the other four were comprised of
two PC 75 items and two PC 25 items. The latter two sets of items were used to manipulate
item-specific proportion congruence within this list. For the purposes of Analysis 1, this third
condition was treated as a PC 50 list for comparison to the PC-67 and PC-33 lists. (Analysis 3
will analyze potential differences between the PC 75 and PC 25 items within the PC 50 list.) It
bears mention, however, that this PC 50 list may not be representative of a typical PC 50 list in
which every item is PC 50 within the list; in other words, the present PC 50 list may be more
volatile than a typical PC 50 list wherein the same control setting can be applied to each item.
The list-wide PC 50 condition was comprised of 432 trials. Additional information about the
stimuli and design can be found in Gonthier et al.

1

Note that behavioral patterns in Gonthier et al. (2016) indicated proportion congruence effects for PC 50 items in
list-wide mostly congruent and list-wide mostly incongruent conditions. These patterns have been taken to indicate
the operation of a list-level control mechanism as opposed to other mechanisms (e.g., contingency learning; see also
Cohen-Shikora, Suh, & Bugg, 2018, for evidence countering a temporal learning mechanism).
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Of the original 93 participants included in this dataset, 83 were retained for analysis. All
10 excluded participants were dropped because they did not complete all the conditions within
the experimental paradigm. Additional demographic information can be found in Gonthier et al.
(2016).
The following trials were excluded based on the exclusion criteria in Aben et al. (2017):
the first trial of each condition (0.41%), error trials (3.77%), and trials following errors (3.77%).
In addition, I box-trimmed the data such that trials <200ms and >3000ms were excluded
(0.34%).
RTs are not typically normally distributed. Following the methods in Aben et al. (2017) I
inverse transformed RTs (1/RT) and multiplied them by -10,000 to restrict the number of
decimal places. This method has been suggested previously by Kinoshita, Mozer, &, Forester
(2011) to better approximate normal distributions. With this transformation method, smaller
inverse RTs reflect faster responses, so the direction of the scale is consistent with raw RTs.
First, collapsing across all conditions, I used a hierarchical linear model (HLM) to
determine how many previous trials back I should use to model the timescale of control. The
predictors in the HLM included congruency of the current trial (Ci), congruency of the kth
previous trials (Ci-k), and the interactions of the current trial and kth previous trials (Ci Ci-k). To be
conservative, I chose to look at up to 24 previous trials back as an initial starting point. Because
of model convergence issues, the HLM was implemented with only the intercept being allowed
to vary on a subject level. This resulted in the level one equation:

The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 3. To be more conservative, and
departing from Aben and colleagues, instead of a one-tailed t-value, I used a two-tailed t-value of
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1.96 for comparison. In the subsequent analysis I chose to include up to 16 trials back given the
t-values were around that level until trial 16 (with a trial distance of 10 and 20 being exceptions).
Following this preliminary analysis, I statistically modeled RTs at two hierarchically
related levels. The level one equation of the model was identical to that of the equation above
with the caveat that k decreased from 24 to 16. This yielded the level one equation:

This equation was applied iteratively to each subject within each condition (list-wide mostly
congruent condition, list-wide PC 50 condition, list-wide mostly incongruent condition). In doing
so, I was able to extract the coefficients of the interaction terms for each subject within each
condition. These coefficients are the conflict adaptation weights (CAWs) I discussed earlier in
this text. Each CAW at a given trial distance reflects the magnitude of shift in the congruency
effect (in reaction time) on the present trial if an incongruent trial was presented at that trial
distance.
Following Aben et al. (2017), at the second level, the 16 CAWs estimated by the level
one equation were entered in as dependent variables in a HLM with trial distance and condition
as predictors. Trial distance was log transformed and then subsequently mean centered to allow
for better interpretation of the intercept in the model. I was unable to implement a fully random
structure without encountering convergence issues. That is, trial distance, condition, and the trial
distance by condition interaction could not be entered in as random effects. This was also the
case in Aben et al. I was able to allow the effect of condition to be random, but I chose to only
allow the intercept to be random to more closely follow the procedure in Aben et al. Allowing
condition to be random or not did not significantly change the results of this analysis.
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The effect of interest is the interaction between trial distance and condition. To assess the
significance of this effect, I entered the predictors in the second level in a stepwise fashion and
tested each model against its previous simpler nested model. Given the nested nature of the
models, a test of the log likelihood ratio determines if the models are significantly different from
one another with larger log likelihoods indicating more variance explained. Nonetheless, I also
include the Akaike information criterion (Akaike, 1974) as a measure of model fit to mimic
Aben et al. (2017). A smaller Akaike information criterion (AIC) indicates a better fit.
The Time Scale of Conflict Learning Results

The summary of the HLM model comparisons are shown in Table 1. The model with
only log trial distance explained the variance in the data better than the model with just the
intercept, Χ2(1) = 99.19, p < .001. The model with only condition also explained the variance in
the data better than the model with just the intercept, Χ2(2) = 22.46, p < .001. The model with
both main effects (log trial distance and condition) explained the data better than both the model
with just log trial distance, Χ2(2) = 23.04, p < .001, and the model with just condition, Χ2(1) =
99.77, p < .001. Critically, there was a trending effect when comparing the full model (with the
interaction) and the main effects only model, Χ2(2) = 5.40, p = .067.
The regression coefficients of the full model are displayed in Table 2. Figure 4 displays
the estimates of the full model corrected for the intercept of each condition (following Aben et
al., 2017) and Figure 5 displays the estimates without intercept correction for interested readers.
I ran a no intercept model and used the coefficients (mean slope for each condition) in a linear
combination to determine if the slopes were different from one another. This was accomplished
using the glht() from the multcomp package in R (Hothorn, Bretz & Westfall, 2008). Because
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degrees of freedom are difficult to estimate, the analysis uses z score estimates to determine
significant differences. The p values were adjusted using the Holm’s procedure. There was a
significant difference between the list-wide mostly congruent slope and list-wide mostly
incongruent slope, z = 2.98, p = .009. There was no significant difference between the list-wide
mostly congruent slope and list-wide PC 50 slope, z = .97, p = .33. There was a trending
difference between the list-wide PC 50 slope and the list-wide mostly incongruent slope, z =
2.01, p = .09.
Discussion

The results from Analysis 1 are generally consistent with the findings from Aben et al.
(2017). I observed a shorter time scale of conflict learning for the list-wide mostly congruent
condition and a longer time scale of conflict learning for the list-wide mostly incongruent
condition. This is made apparent by the more dramatic reduction in CAWs as trial distance
increased in the list-wide mostly congruent condition compared to the list-wide mostly
incongruent condition. This result indicates that the conflict learning mechanism places more
importance or weight on recent events during low conflict situations, and it may change the
relative weighting scheme to allow more distal events to play more of a role in high conflict
situations.
The trajectory of the list-wide PC 50 condition suggests that this list had a time scale of
control learning that was more similar to the list-wide mostly congruent condition than the listwide mostly incongruent condition. When comparing the slopes of the trajectories, there was no
difference between the list-wide PC 50 condition and list-wide mostly congruent condition, but
there was a trend for the list-wide PC 50 condition to differ from the list-wide mostly
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incongruent condition. Interestingly, the pattern of results for the list-wide PC 50 condition from
Gonthier et al. (2016) appears to be similar to the volatile condition in Aben et al. (2017). Aben
and colleagues posited that the volatile condition induced a greater reliance on recent trials
(shorter time scale) due to its unstable nature. They suggested the volatile condition is unstable
because the list switches back and forth between low conflict and high conflict conditions every
20 trials (see also, Jiang, et al., 2014). In unstable conditions, the cognitive control apparatus
would have to shift quickly between substantially different control settings if it were to track
context shifts. With that view, the time scale of control would benefit from being shorter in
contexts where levels of conflict shift dramatically. Given this, the similarity of the pattern
observed in the list-wide PC 50 condition in Gonthier et al. to the volatile condition in Aben et
al. may not be surprising. In Gonthier et al., items within the list-wide PC 50 list were either PC
75 (mostly congruent), PC 50, or PC 25 (mostly incongruent), and Gonthier et al. reported
evidence showing participants did use item-level control within this list. In other words, the
control settings they used varied substantially from one item to the next within the list. Because
the order in which items are presented is unpredictable, this condition can be thought of as
volatile at the list-level.
The general replication of the findings of Aben et al. (2017), both in terms of showing
differences in the time scales for mostly congruent and mostly incongruent lists and in showing
that a novel type of volatile, PC 50 list behaved similarly to the volatile list in their study,
provides evidence that the extended-CSE model is able to capture the time scale of conflict
learning in tasks other than flanker. A potential caveat to note, however, is that the tasks used in
Aben et al. (flanker) and Gonthier et al. (2016) (picture-word Stroop) share a common feature in
that they both entail stimuli for which the relevant and irrelevant dimensions are separated to
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some degree, and thus may both involve spatial attention.. It could be argued that the extendedCSE model may not yield consistent patterns for qualitatively different tasks, such as those for
which the dimensions are fully integrated (e.g., color word Stroop; Spieler, Balota, & Faust,
2000). However, if the model is capturing the time scale of conflict learning from a task-general
control mechanism, then the model ought to result in similar patterns across cognitive control
tasks. If the patterns seen here are not replicable across tasks, then the only way to salvage the
interpretation that the extended-CSE model captures time scales is by adopting a nonparsimonious account of conflict learning that assumes task-specific learning mechanisms.
Thus, it is important to investigate whether we can observe similar patterns when this model is
applied to qualitatively different control tasks.
In Analysis 2, I applied the extended-CSE model to a dataset from Gourley et al. (2016)
which used a color-word Stroop task. The color-word Stroop task is qualitatively different from
both the flanker task and the picture-word Stroop task because the relevant and irrelevant
dimensions are integrated (as opposed to separated in the flanker and picture-word Stroop task)
(MacLeod, 1998; Spieler, et al. 2000). If the pattern of results is similar in a color-word Stroop
task, then the extended-CSE model can provide evidence that the time scale of control learning is
part of a task-general control mechanism.
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Analysis 2: Examining the List-Wide Time Scale of Conflict Learning in a Color-Word
Stroop Task from Gourley et al. (2016)
Method

In Gourley et al. (2016) each participant was also exposed to three conditions. They
comprised of a list-wide mostly congruent condition, a list-wide mostly incongruent condition,
and a list-wide PC 50 condition. All three conditions included four PC 50 picture items. What
differed across conditions was the PC of the other four picture items included in each list. In the
list-wide mostly congruent condition, the other four were PC 75. This led to an overall PC 67
list. In the list-wide mostly incongruent condition, the other four were PC 25. This created an
overall PC 33 list. The list-wide mostly congruent and incongruent conditions were comprised of
288 trials. For the third condition, the list-wide PC 60 condition, the other four were comprised
of two PC 100 items and two PC 25 items. The latter two sets of items were used to manipulate
item-specific proportion congruence within this list. The list-wide PC 60 condition contained 480
trials.
All of the original 96 participants included in this dataset were retained for analysis. The
following trials were excluded: the first trial of each condition (0.28%), error trials (3.67%), and
trials following errors (3.67%). In addition, I box-trimmed the data such that trials <200ms and
>3000ms were excluded (0.82%). The RTs were transformed in the same fashion as in Analysis
1.
As in Analysis 1, I first sought to determine how many previous trials back I should use
for modeling the time scale of control. Again, I chose to look at up to 24 previous trials back as
an initial starting point. To keep the analysis consistent with Analysis I, the HLM was
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implemented with only the intercept being allowed to vary on a subject level. This resulted in
the level one equation:

The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 6. For the time scale of conflict learning
analysis, I chose to include up to 8 trials back given the t-values were above 1.96 through trial 8.
Following this preliminary analysis, for the time scale of conflict learning, I statistically
modeled RTs at two hierarchically related levels. The level one equation of the model was
identical to that of the equation above with the caveat that k decreased from 24 to 8. This yielded
the level one equation:

This equation was applied iteratively to each subject within each condition (list-wide mostly
congruent condition, list-wide PC 60 condition, list-wide mostly incongruent condition). In doing
so, I was able to extract the coefficients of the interaction terms for each subject within each
condition.
At the second level, the 8 CAWs estimated by the level one equation were entered in as
dependent variables in a HLM with trial distance and condition as predictors. Trial distance was
log transformed and then subsequently mean centered to allow for better interpretation of the
intercept in the model. I chose to only allow the intercept to be random to keep the analysis
procedure consistent with Analysis I and Aben et al. (2017). To assess the significance of the log
trial distance x condition interaction, I entered the predictors in the second level in a stepwise
fashion and tested each model against its previous simpler nested model.
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The Time Scale of Conflict Learning Results

The summary of the HLM model comparisons are shown in Table 3. The model with
only log trial distance explained the variance in the data better than the model with just the
intercept, Χ2(1) = 127.48, p < .001. The model with only condition also explained the variance
in the data better than the model with just the intercept, Χ2(2) = 12.44, p = .002. The model with
both main effects of log trial distance and condition explains the data better than both the model
with just log trial distance, Χ2(2) = 13.18, p = .001, and the model with just condition, Χ2(1) =
128.22, p < .001. Importantly, there was a significant effect when comparing the full model (with
the interaction) and the main effects only model, Χ2(2) = 19.74, p < .001.
The regression coefficients of the full model are displayed in Table 4. Figure 7. displays
the estimates of the full model corrected for the intercept of each condition and Figure 8.
displays the estimates without intercept correction. Using a no intercept model and the glht()
function I investigated the pairwise differences in slopes. There was a significant difference
between the list-wide mostly congruent slope and list-wide mostly incongruent slope, z = 2.66, p
= .02. There was also a significant difference between the list-wide PC 60 slope and the listwide mostly incongruent slope, z = 4.73, p < .001. Interestingly, there was also a significant
difference between the list-wide mostly congruent slope and the list-wide PC 60 slope, z = 2.08,
p = .04.
Discussion

I observed a shorter time scale of conflict learning in the list-wide mostly congruent
condition compared to the list-wide mostly incongruent condition. I also observed a shorter time
scale of conflict learning in the list-wide PC 60 condition compared to the list-wide mostly
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incongruent condition. These results align with the results from Analysis 1 and Aben et al.
(2017). Interestingly, differing from the PC 50 list in Analysis 1, the PC 60 list had a shorter time
scale than the list-wide mostly congruent condition. This may seem surprising since the listwide mostly congruent condition is PC 67. That is, the list-wide mostly congruent condition is
less conflicting than the list-wide PC 60 condition. Thus far, the patterns from this model have
indicated that a decrease in conflict levels shortens the time scale of conflict learning reflecting
shifts away from proactive control and towards reactive control. However, the list-wide PC 60
condition is also an unstable condition because it biases use of item-level control (given the
inclusion of items with different proportion congruencies in the list). With the perspective that
there is an additive effect of list-level conflict and list-level instability for shifts to reactive
control, then it could be that the list-level instability of the PC 60 list shortened the time scale of
conflict learning enough to compensate for and “overcome” the .07 proportion congruence
difference between the PC 67 list-wide mostly congruent list and the list-wide PC 60 list.
Alternatively, given that this was not observed in Analysis 1, it could be a Type 1 error.
Given the general concordance of results for list-wide mostly congruent and incongruent
conditions from Analysis 1, 2, and Aben et al. (2016), the extended-CSE model appears to be
robust enough to capture time scale patterns that ought to be similar across qualitatively different
cognitive control tasks if there is a task-general control mechanism. Still, a lingering question
that remains is do time scale differences emerge for items that have different levels of conflict
within the same list? The motivation for assuming different time scales for list-level control
emerges from behavioral differences that indicate that different attention settings are applied to
mostly congruent and mostly incongruent lists. As mentioned earlier, similar behavioral
differences are present when comparing mostly congruent and mostly incongruent items within a
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list which indicate item-level control. However, for item-level control, conflict learning reflects
an accumulation of conflict experiences across mostly congruent and mostly incongruent
instances of items as opposed to experiences across each successive trial. In other words, the
random presentation of mostly congruent and mostly incongruent items within a list means that
the previous trial’s conflict status is not necessarily informative for the item in the current trial
(see Figure 9). Only the conflict statuses of previous instances of that item would be informative.
Consequently, if there are differences in the time scale of conflict learning for items with
different proportion congruences, then differences in the CAW slopes would be seen in previous
instances of an item and not previous trials. To investigate time scale differences for items with
differing proportion congruences, I applied the extended-CSE model selectively to the list-wide
PC 50 condition from Gonthier et al. (2016) which was designed to investigate item-level
control. In addition, I modified the model to use log instance distance (as opposed to log trial
distance) as a predictor. I could not apply the extended-CSE model to the Gourley et al. (2016)
list-wide PC 60 condition, which also was designed to investigate item-level control, because
mostly congruent items in that condition were PC 100 and thus there were no incongruent trials
to model for those items.
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Analysis 3: Examining the Item-Specific Time Scale of Conflict Learning in a PictureWord Stroop Task from Gonthier et al. (2016)
Method

As described in Analysis 1, the PC 50 list in the Gonthier et al. (2016) study included an
item-specific proportion congruence manipulation whereby two picture items were mostly
congruent and two picture items were mostly incongruent2. As also described previously, there
were four PC 50 items; however, given that there were only 12 instances of a particular PC 50
item in the list (e.g., only 12 instances of the color blue), I excluded PC 50 items from this
analysis and only examined mostly congruent and mostly incongruent items. 89 participants who
completed the item-specific proportion congruence (PC 50 list) condition were included in this
analysis. The following trials were excluded: the first trial of each condition (0.16%), error trials
(3.44%), and trials following errors (3.44%). In addition, I box-trimmed the data such that trials
<200ms and >3000ms were excluded (0.32%). The RTs were transformed in the same fashion
as in Analysis I and II.
There are a fourth the number of instances of an item in the item-specific proportion
congruence condition as there are total trials in the list-wide mostly congruent condition.
Therefore, it did not seem reasonable to try and determine how many instances back I should
look using t-value cutoffs as I did in Analysis 1 and 2. Thus, I chose to look back up to 6

2

The list-wide PC 50 condition in Gonthier et al. (2016) was designed such that the relevant dimension of items
(picture) differentially predicted proportion congruence (whether an item was mostly congruent or mostly
incongruent) but it did not differentially predict responses. That is, the pictures were correlated with the correct
response 100% of the time, regardless of whether the item was mostly congruent or mostly incongruent (for further
explication, see Bugg, 2012; Bugg et al., 2011). As detailed in the dual item-specific mechanism account of itemspecific proportion congruence effects (Bugg, 2015; Bugg & Hutchison, 2013; Bugg et al., 2011), this type of design
produces a control-based item-specific proportion congruence effects and not a contingency-based effect (see also
Chiu et al. 2017).
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instances (a fourth of my original maximum for list-wide analyses) for the time scale of conflict
learning analysis. The resulting level one linear model for the time scale analysis was:

Here, Ci-1 refers to the first prior instance of a given item (e.g., the last time a picture of a bird
was presented). This equation was applied iteratively to each subject for each item type (mostly
congruent and mostly incongruent). In doing so, I was able to extract the coefficients of the
interaction terms for each subject for each item type.
At the second level, the 6 CAWs estimated by the level one equation were entered in as
dependent variables in a HLM with log instance distance and item type as predictors. I entered
the predictors in the second level in a stepwise fashion and tested each model against its previous
simpler nested model.
The Time Scale of Conflict Learning Results

The summary of the HLM model comparisons are shown in Table 5. The model with
only log instance distance explained the variance in the data better than the model with just the
intercept, Χ2(1) = 5.63, p = .018. The model with only item type showed trending evidence of
explaining the variance in the data better than the model with just the intercept, Χ2(1) = 3.69, p =
.054. The model with both main effects of log instance distance and item type also showed
trending evidence that it explained the data better than the model with just log instance distance,
Χ2(1) = 13.18, p = .001. The model with both main effects did explain the data better than the
model with just item type, Χ2(1) = 5.64, p = .017. Importantly, there was no significant
difference when comparing the full model (with the interaction) and the main effects only model,
Χ2(1) = .48, p = .488.
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The regression coefficients of the full model are displayed in Table 6. Figure 10 displays
the estimates of the full model corrected for the intercept of each condition and Figure 11.
displays the estimates without intercept correction. The t-value for the interaction shows no
significant difference between the slopes of the item types.
Discussion

I observed no difference in the time scale of conflict learning for mostly congruent and
mostly incongruent items within a list. One interpretation of this result is that, for items within a
list that bias adoption of item-level control, the time scale of conflict learning does not differ as a
function of probability of conflict for specific items. Note that this account does not exclude the
possibility that the time scale of conflict learning for items is dependent on the global proportion
congruence of the list in which the items reside (as demonstrated in Analysis 1). An equally
plausible interpretation is that the extended-CSE model does not capture the time scale for items.
This account would imply that conflict learning differences are not evident from the independent
influence of previous instances and another model would better capture the time scale for items
within a list requiring item-level control.
Another possibility is that differences in the time scale could emerge with this modeling
procedure, but they are not observable in the Gonthier et al. (2016) data because of insufficient
power. The results indicated no significant difference for mostly congruent items and mostly
incongruent items, but the direction of the pattern was visually similar to the list-wide time scale
pattern (see Figure 4 and 7). To address this possibility, in Analysis 4, I examined data from
Bugg and Dey (2018) which also used an item-specific proportion congruence manipulation
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within a picture-word Stroop task but with many more participants to determine if the results
from Analysis 3 were replicable.

Analysis 4: Examining the Item-Specific Time Scale of Conflict Learning in a PictureWord Stroop Task from Bugg and Dey (2018).
Method

I merged data from five experiments in Bugg and Dey (2018, Exp 1, Exp 2, Exp 3b, Exp
4b, and Exp 5). The Stroop phase of these experiments was identical and the behavioral results in
RTs yielded the same effects across experiments, and as in Gonthier et al. (2016). Specifically,
there was a reliable and typical item-specific proportion congruence effect such that the mostly
congruent items had a larger Stroop effect than the mostly incongruent items. There were four
picture items (bird, cat, dog, and fish). These items were split into two sets (bird-cat, dog-fish).
One item set was mostly congruent and the other set was mostly incongruent. The mostly
congruent items were PC 67 and the mostly incongruent items were PC 33 such that the overall
list was PC 50, as in Gonthier et al. (2016; Analysis 3).3 There were no PC 50 items in these
experiments.4 Participants were presented with 432 trials in total. Additional details on the
design and stimuli can be found in Bugg and Dey (2018).
Aggregating across the five experiments, there were 216 participants who were included
in this analysis. The following trials were excluded: the first trial of each condition (0.19%),
error trials (4.79%), and trials following errors (4.79%). In addition, I box-trimmed the data such

3

Similar to the list-wide PC 50 condition in Gonthier et al. (2016), the item-specific proportion congruence designs
used in Bugg and Dey (2018) produced control-based item-specific proportion congruence effects.
4
In Bugg and Dey (2018) picture stimuli could be treated as members of a category of pictures (e.g., bird, cat, dog,
or fish) or individual exemplars within a category (e.g., robin, oriole, or pigeon). PC 50 exemplars were presented
in this experiment, but they were always members of either a mostly congruent or mostly incongruent category.
Here we treat the category as the item.

28

that trials <200ms and >3000ms were excluded (0.39%). The RTs were transformed in the same
fashion as in Analysis 1, 2, and 3. To keep consistent with Analysis 3, I chose to look back up to
6 instances.
The Time Scale of Conflict Learning Results

The summary of the HLM model comparisons are shown in Table 7. The model with
only log instance distance explained the variance in the data better than the model with just the
intercept, Χ2(1) = 35.94, p < .001. There was no difference between the model with only item
type and the model with just the intercept, Χ2(1) = .24, p = .618. There was no difference
between the model with both main effects of log instance distance and item type and the model
with just log instance distance, Χ2(1) = .25, p = .615. The model with both main effects did
explain the data significantly better than the model with just item type, Χ2(1) = 35.94, p < .001.
Importantly, as in Analysis 3, there was no significant difference when comparing the full model
(with the interaction) and the main effects only model, Χ2(1) = .41, p = .522.
The regression coefficients of the full model are displayed in Table 8. Figure 12 displays
the estimates of the full model corrected for the intercept of each condition and Figure 13
displays the estimates without intercept correction. The t-value for the interaction shows no
significant difference between the slopes of the item types.
Discussion
I observed no difference in the time scale of conflict learning for mostly congruent and
mostly incongruent items which replicated the results from Analysis 3. This provides evidence
that the null result from Analysis 3 is unlikely to be attributable to insufficient power. However,
the results from Analysis 4 do not adjudicate between the two interpretations that were proposed
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for why there is no difference in the time scale of conflict learning for mostly congruent and
mostly incongruent items. One interpretation is that the time scale of conflict learning is not
modulated by the probability of conflict for specific items, while another interpretation is that the
extended-CSE model is an inappropriate method for capturing time scale differences at the itemlevel. I will consider these two interpretations further in the General Discussion.

General Discussion

The set of analyses presented in this paper aimed to accomplish three goals. First, I
attempted to replicate time scale patterns for list-wide proportion congruence manipulations
observed in Aben et al. (2017) using their extended-CSE model. Second, I attempted to validate
the model across different tasks to provide evidence that the model indexed a task-general
conflict learning mechanism. Third, I extended their model to attempt to describe the time scale
of conflict learning for items within a list that required item-level control. Combined, these
goals served to further refine extant theoretical and computational models of a general cognitive
control apparatus. Specifically, I attempted to better characterize the conflict learning
mechanism that is assumed to be required for the control system to adjust attention settings based
on statistical regularities of conflict.
Differences in the Time Scale of Conflict Learning between List-Wide Mostly Congruent
and List-Wide Mostly Incongruent Contexts

Analyses 1 and 2 converged on the notion that low conflict contexts have a short time
scale for conflict learning as compared to high conflict contexts. This was evident in differences
in the slopes of the CAW trajectories for list-wide mostly congruent and list-wide mostly
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incongruent conditions, with the list-wide mostly congruent conditions showing more dramatic
reductions in CAW as trial distance increased. Importantly, this pattern was evident across two
qualitatively different tasks (picture-word Stroop and color-word Stroop). This provides
evidence that the extended-CSE model (Aben et al., 2017), a model that was validated initially
with a flanker task, captures the time scale of conflict learning at the list-level regardless of the
nature of the conflicting stimuli (i.e., from fully separable to fully integrated dimensions). This
suggests the model may be indexing task-general control mechanisms.
An important assumption for this interpretation (i.e., that the global probability of conflict
is related to different time scales of learning) is that the relative reduction in CAWs across trial
distance (i.e., the slopes of the trajectories across trials) is the measure that captures time scale.
This measure ignores the relative difference in the magnitude of CAWs averaging across trial
distances (i.e., the main effect of condition). Figures 5 and 8 plot the CAWs of the list-wide
conditions that include the main effect of condition. These figures show that within a window
size of 16 and 8, respectively, all previous trials in the list-wide mostly congruent condition
showed a nominally larger independent effect of incongruent trials compared to the independent
effect of incongruent trials in the list-wide mostly incongruent condition. Within these window
sizes, the trajectories did not cross such that the independent effect at a distal trial distance was
nominally less in the list-wide mostly congruent condition. The interpretation I forward here is
that the main effect of condition reflects the difference in overall levels of attention, whereas the
change in CAWs, or the slope, is more reflective of learning. To reiterate, a CAW at a trial
distance of k is the independent effect of the kth previous trial if that trial were incongruent.
More negative average CAWs would thus mean that larger adjustments are made following an
incongruent trial. In the list-wide mostly congruent condition, incongruent trials are infrequent
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and thus a relaxed attentional state would usually be preferred to minimize taxing cognitive
resources. Therefore, the presentation of an infrequent incongruent trial would “jump-start” the
control system to produce a reflexive/reactive increase in attention. This would be observed as
more negative CAW values. In contrast, in the list-wide mostly incongruent condition,
incongruent trials are frequent and thus a focused attentional state would be preferred to maintain
accuracy. In this condition, less negative average CAW values would be predicted because
there is less need for adjustments to be made during a focused state. Thus, the difference in the
average magnitude of CAWs (the main effect of condition) indexes the difference in average
levels of attention (within a given window size), with less negative CAWs reflecting a more
focused state. In contrast, steeper shifts in CAWs for from trial-to-trial for the list-wide mostly
congruent condition reflect greater weighting of recent trials relative to distal trials. If the
conflict learning mechanism accumulates conflict information using an exponentially decaying
function, as assumed by reinforcement learning models, this would mean that the learning rate is
set such that control adjustments are more reliant on the first few previous trials, and less reliant
on the global probability of conflict within the condition. Comparatively shallower shifts in
CAWs in the list-wide mostly incongruent condition reflect relatively less reliance on recent
trials and more reliance on the global probability of conflict within the condition.
Time Scale of Conflict Learning for “Volatile” Lists that Bias Adoption of Item-Level
Control

Analysis 1 and 2 revealed that list-wide PC 50 and list-wide PC 60 lists, which had listlevel proportion congruences in-between mostly congruent and mostly incongruent lists,
produced time scales of conflict learning that were more similar to time scales produced by listwide mostly congruent lists than those produced by list-wide mostly incongruent lists. This may
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be an unsurprising result if one takes the view that time scales are predominantly impacted by the
type of control that is engaged and less so by the probability of conflict per se. The list-wide PC
50 and list-wide PC 60 lists were composed of items with very different item-specific proportion
congruences (i.e., either PC 75 or PC 100 for mostly congruent items and PC 25 for mostly
incongruent items). Similar to list-wide mostly congruent conditions, lists with very different
item-specific proportion congruences are thought to engage more reactive control processes.
Thus, a strong interpretation of the results from the present research would be that more
engagement of reactive control processes leads to a short time scale and more engagement of
proactive control processes leads to a long time scale regardless of the probability of conflict
experienced. For example, an individual relying more heavily on proactive control processes in
a list-wide mostly congruent condition may express a long time scale of conflict learning, which
would contradict the group-level patterns for list-wide mostly congruent conditions found in the
present research.
Time Scale of Conflict Learning for Mostly Congruent and Mostly Incongruent Items
within a List

In Analysis 3, I observed no difference in the time scales for items with vastly different
probabilities of conflict within the same list. That is, mostly congruent items expressed the same
time scale as mostly incongruent items within a list. Both types of items are thought to trigger
adjustments to attention reactively and not proactively. That I did not observe any differences is
consistent with the view that the time scale of conflict learning is contingent on the type of
control engaged and not the probability of conflict. This interpretation is unlikely to be founded
on a Type II error as the results were replicated in Analysis 4 using a larger data set.

The

observed time scale invariance demonstrates that differential modulations of attention for items
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are not influenced by different learning rates for items. This is consistent with an episodic
retrieval account of cognitive control, forwarded by Crump and Milliken (2009), which would
assume that items become bound to attentional settings over time, and the rate at which the
association between item and attentional setting is formed does not differ based on the item type
(mostly congruent or mostly incongruent). Additionally, these results may point to separable yet
concurrent conflict learning processes for the list-level and the item-level. That is, Analysis 1
and Analysis 3 combined demonstrate that the congruency effect of current trials is impacted by
both previous trials and previous instances (although these analyses do not demonstrate
independent effects).

Further research is needed, however, to strengthen these conclusions as

the above interpretations rely on the assumption that the modification I made to the extendedCSE model is an appropriate method for quantifying time scales of conflict learning for
individual items. I have only used two data sets to determine this method’s validity in capturing
time scales of conflict learning at the item-level, and so my conclusions may be tentative until
this method is applied to additional lists from experiments that bias adoption of item-level
control.
Implications for Extant Models of Cognitive Control

The results of this present research have important implications for many conflicttriggered cognitive control models. The conflict-monitoring hypothesis (Botvinick et al. 2001) is
a seminal account of cognitive control because it allows for the quantification of conflict and
demonstrates that conflict monitoring explains behavioral and neuroimaging data for list-level
control processes. The conflict-monitoring hypothesis assumes that there is a monitoring unit
that tracks conflict and appropriately adjusts attention at the pathway level (e.g., color or word
34

pathway in color-word Stroop). The item-specific adaptation of the conflict monitoring
hypothesis (Blais et al. 2007) modified the original model to also account for item-level control
processes by assuming that attention adjustments are made at the level of items (e.g., word
reading is attenuated for mostly congruent items). A conflict-modulated Hebbian learning model
(Verguts & Notebaert, 2008) has also been forwarded and accounts for global pathway-level
control (different tasks in a task switching paradigm) and item-level control.
Importantly, and relevant for the present research, none of the above models specified
how many trials (or instances) back the conflict monitoring unit utilizes to determine levels of
conflict (or probability of conflict). The present results concur with the results from Aben et al.
(2017) in demonstrating the ability to quantify time scales of conflict learning and by showing
that time scale parameters systematically vary based on the type of control engaged. These
findings provide a basis for updating extant conflict-modulated accounts of cognitive control.
Specifically, the results indicate that using a single learning rate parameter for a list-level conflict
monitoring unit is not optimal because low conflict lists produce short time scales and high
conflict lists produce long time scales. In other words, low conflict contexts seem to produce a
large learning rate, such that the level of conflict is determined by relatively recent trials, and
high conflict contexts seem to produce a small learning rate such that the level of conflict is
determined by both recent and distal trials. This is consistent with the dual mechanisms of
control account (De Pisapia & Braver, 2006) which predicts long time scales for proactive
control processes and short time scales for reactive control processes. In addition, according to
the item-level time scale results (Analyses 3 and 4), the pattern of conflict learning for items
does not follow the pattern of list-level conflict learning. That is, there are no differences in time
scales based on items with differing probabilities of conflict. Thus, it is possible that there are
35

two conflict monitoring units, one at the list-level (or at the global pathway level), and one at the
item-level. Following this interpretation, when there are high levels of conflict, the analyses in
the present study indicate that a list-level conflict monitoring unit and an item-level conflict
monitoring unit use differing amounts of information. That is, when calculating the probability
of conflict for a given trial, a list-level conflict monitoring unit uses both recent and distal trials
in lists with a high probability of conflict. In comparison, when calculating the probability of
conflict for a given instance, an item-level conflict monitoring unit uses mostly recent instances
for an item with a high probability of conflict. This may be unsurprising if one takes the view
that information about conflict on previous instances or trials degrades over time. Since previous
instances of an item are more spread out temporally than previous trials in a list, a conflict
monitoring unit may only use recent instances by necessity because conflict information from
more distal instances have been lost in some sense. Future replications of this work
notwithstanding, these contrasting findings for list-level and item-level control further support
that these two mechanisms are dissociable (cf. Gonthier et al., 2016).
Limitations and Future Directions

The conclusions of the present research regarding the time scale of conflict learning, as
well as those of Aben et al. (2017), hinge on the notion that the CSE is a behavioral marker for
adjustments of attention. In other words, the CSE reflects the output of a cognitive control
mechanism (Blais et al., 2007; Botvinick et al., 2001; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008). Other
accounts posit that the CSE is more reflective of simple stimulus-response processes and control
need not be invoked to explain observed effects (Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004; Mayr, Awh, &
Laurey, 2003; Schmidt & De Houwer, 2011). One such account is the feature-integration
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account (Hommel et al., 2004) which posits that the features of the stimulus and response of a
trial get bound together in an event file. In the next trial, when all the features (complete
repetition) or none of the features (complete alternation) match the event file, processing is
facilitated relative to trials where there is some overlap (partial repetition) with the event file. In
a two-alternative-forced choice task (e.g., a two-choice color-word Stroop task), congruentcongruent sequences and incongruent-incongruent sequences will always be either complete
repetitions or complete alternations. In contrast, congruent-incongruent and incongruentcongruent sequences will always be partial repetitions. Thus, the CSE can be explained by
processes that do not require a control mechanism in two-alternative-forced choice tasks.
However, when moving to four-alternative-forced choice tasks, it has been demonstrated that
CSE is still observed either by preventing feature repetitions from occurring in sequence
(Jiménez & Méndez, 2013) or by removing feature repetitions from sequential analyses (Akcay
& Hazeltine, 2007).
But, the CSE in four-alternative-forced choice tasks can be explained by another
associative account – the contingency account (Schimidt & De Houwer, 2011). The contingency
account claims that the irrelevant stimulus feature (e.g., the word BLUE) becomes associated
with its congruent response (i.e., the color blue) because there are more presentations of each
congruent stimulus than there are of each incongruent stimulus (for review, see Egner 2017).
For example, in the list-wide mostly congruent condition from Gonthier et al. (2016) the word
CAT was presented with a cat picture 54 times and was presented with a dog, fish, and bird
picture six times each. Thus, instead of differentiating stimuli based on conflict (i.e., congruent
or incongruent stimuli), one can differentiate stimuli based on contingency (i.e., highcontingency or low-contingency stimuli). One can then re-express the CSE as a contingency
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sequence effect as it has been shown that high-contingency trials are responded to faster than
low-contingency trials, and contingency constant sequences (i.e., low-contingency – lowcontingency, or high-contingency – high-contingency) facilitate performance (Schimidt & De
Houwer, 2011). A way to demonstrate the CSE controlling for contingency and feature
repetitions is by using a four-alternative-choice task that is comprised of two non-overlapping
two-alternative-choice sets that alternate in sequence (Schmidt & Weissman, 2014).
Importantly, in both the present research and in Aben et al. (2017), a design controlling for both
a feature-integration account and a contingency account of the CSE was not used. That is, on
some subset of trial sequences the feature-integration account could explain the CSE due to
partial repetitions, and for some lists and items, contingency learning could be driving the CSE
because words co-occurred with congruent responses (picture or color) more often than other
incongruent responses.
However, all the datasets in the present research and the data from Aben et al. (2017)
used list-wide or item-specific manipulations that produced list-wide and item-specific effects
that cannot be accounted for by contingency learning. That is, in the list-wide manipulations,
transfer of proportion congruence effects to PC 50 items was observed which rules out a
contingency account of list-wide proportion congruence effects. Likewise, in the item-specific
manipulations, the co-occurrence of words with their respective congruent responses did not
allow for contingency learning, ruling out a contingency account of item-specific proportion
congruence effects. Thus, to claim that contingency learning is influencing the time courses of
CAWs observed here, one would have to assume contingency learning influences CAWs even
though it cannot account for overall behavior (i.e., list-wide proportion congruence and itemspecific effects).
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The extended-CSE model is more powerful than conventional CSE and proportion
congruence models as it uses more of the data to estimate the parameters of interest.
Specifically, it uses trial level data and includes more than a single previous trial when predicting
behavior of a current trial, whereas conventional CSE models use only a single trial back and
proportion congruence models collapse behavior across many trials. Because of this, it is finegrained since we can obtain CAWs for any number of previous trials back. However, this also
comes with limitations. The number of parameters that are estimated by the level one equation
in the model is quite large. As a result, the CAWs extracted for each person and each condition
must be generated by individual ordinary least-squares regressions. These coefficients are not
adjusted for by the reliability of observations and are more susceptible to outliers (Snijders &
Bosker, 2012). In comparison, in a true hierarchical linear modeling framework, the CAWs for
each person in each condition would be adjusted to account for unreliable observations or
outliers through shrinkage. A true hierarchical linear modeling procedure cannot be applied to
the extended-CSE model because it requires many more trials per subject than what is practically
feasible. Hierarchical linear models fail to converge when there are not enough observations for
the number of specified parameters to be estimated. In Aben et al. (2017) the number of
parameters that were estimated for each participant in each condition was 26. In Analysis 1 and
2, the number of parameters to be estimated was 34 and 18, respectively. In Analysis 3 and 4,
the number of parameters to be estimated was 14. In all analyses presented here, the model failed
to converge when applying a true hierarchical linear modeling procedure.
Alternative models aiming to characterize the time scale of conflict learning would
benefit from reducing the number of parameters to be estimated while taking advantage of as
much of the data as the extended-CSE model does. Examples of potential models include those
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that use learning rate parameters as a means of indexing the time scale of control (Chiu, Jiang, &
Egner, 2017; Jiang, Beck, Heller, & Egner, 2015; Jiang, et al., 2014). Drawing inspiration from
these models, one could assume that the proportion congruence estimated for the current trial
(which would inform selection of an attentional state) is a function of a weighted combination of
the previous trial and the previous estimated proportion congruence. The weighting is
determined by a learning rate. For example, the function may be formalized as,
lPCi = λCi + (1-λ)lPCi-1, where, lPCi is the local proportion congruence as of the current trial. Ci
is the congruency state of the current trial. And, lPCi-1 is the local proportion congruence as of
the last trial. Here, λ serves as the learning rate such that when λ is large the local proportion
congruence as of the current trial is mostly determined by more recent trials. Essentially, λ
parameterizes the time scale of control. The advantage of such models is that they greatly reduce
the number of parameters to be estimated at the lowest level of a hierarchical linear model.
Appropriately adjusted and more accurate estimates may then be extracted from the same
number of observations and individual differences could be extracted with a large enough sample
size.
Conclusion

In conclusion, I applied an extended-CSE model developed by Aben and colleagues
(2017) to two qualitatively different cognitive control tasks and demonstrated the model’s ability
to consistently capture the time scale of conflict learning. I replicated the results from Aben and
colleagues and observed a) a relatively short time scale for low conflict list-wide contexts (i.e.,
mostly congruent lists) and volatile list-wide contexts, and b) a relatively long time scale for high
conflict list-wide contexts (i.e., mostly incongruent lists). I discussed how these findings point to
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a task-general conflict learning mechanism. I also applied the extended-CSE model to mostly
congruent and mostly incongruent items within a list and found no differences in the time scale
of items with vastly different probabilities of conflict. Based on the collective pattern of results, I
forwarded the idea that the conflict learning mechanism modulates time scales of conflict
learning based on whether proactive or reactive control processes are recruited but does not
modulate the time scale based on the nature of the reactive control process that is recruited (i.e., a
focused vs. relaxed attentional setting). This model provides a means of quantifying conflict
learning which can subsequently be used to refine extant mechanistic and theoretical models of
cognitive control by empirically determining learning rate parameters for conflict monitoring
units.
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Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Hypothetical data depicting the congruency sequence effect (CSE). Plotted on the x
axis is the trial type of the preceding trial. Red circles depict current congruent trials. Blue
triangles depict current incongruent trials. The difference in red and blue points for each
previous trial type depicts the congruency effect. This plot shows that the congruency effect is
reduced when the previous trial is incongruent compared to when the previous trial is congruent.
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Figure 2. Hypothetical influence of previous trials’ congruency state on the current trial’s
congruency effect. Conflict adaptation on the current trial, otherwise known as the conflictadaptation weight (CAW), is plotted on the y-axis. Trial distance is plotted on the x-axis. The
relative change in CAW across trial distance (i.e., the slopes of the trajectories) index the time
scale of conflict learning. Long time scales are indexed by relatively smaller changes across trial
distance. Short time scales are indexed by relatively steeper changes across trial distance.
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Figure 3. Ci Ci-k interaction t values of the level one model (k ranges from 1 - 24), plotted as a
function of trial distance. The dotted line represents the critical two-tailed t-value of 1.96 given
infinite degrees of freedom. Data are from list-wide manipulations of a picture-word Stroop task
Gonthier et al. (2016).
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Figure 4. Estimates of the CAWs in Model 4 (full model) using data from Gonthier et al. (2016).
Each condition is plotted after subtracting its intercept. The original scale of trial distance is
displayed on the x-axis, not log trial distance (which was included in the linear mixed models for
statistical testing).
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Figure 5. Estimates of the CAWs in Model 4 (full model) using data from Gonthier et al. (2016).
No intercept correction was applied. The original scale of trial distance is displayed on the xaxis.
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Figure 6. Ci Ci-k interaction t values of the model (k ranges from 1 - 24), plotted as a function of
trial distance. The dotted line represents the critical two-tailed t-value of 1.96 given infinite
degrees of freedom. Data are from list-wide manipulations of a color-word Stroop task from
Gourley et al. (2016).

54

Figure 7. Estimates of the CAWs in Model 4 (full model) using data from Gourley et al. (2016).
Each condition is plotted after subtracting its intercept. The original scale of trial distance is
displayed on the x-axis.
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Figure 8. Estimates of the CAWs in Model 4 (full model) using data from Gourley et al. (2016).
No intercept correction was applied. The original scale of trial distance is displayed on the xaxis.
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Figure 9. Schematic representation of list-level conflict learning and item-level conflict learning.
Items are presented sequentially from top to bottom. For list-level conflict learning, control is
modulated by aggregating (using an exponential weighting scheme) the conflict statuses of
previous trials to arrive at probability of conflict for the current circled trial. For item-level
conflict learning, to modulate control for the current circled item (i.e., the color blue), the
conflict statuses of previous instances of that item must be aggregated.
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Figure 10. Estimates of the CAWs in Model 4 (full model) using mostly congruent and mostly
incongruent items within the list-wide PC 50 condition in Gonthier et al. (2016). Each condition
is plotted after subtracting its intercept. The original scale of trial distance is displayed on the xaxis.
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Figure 11. Estimates of the CAWs in Model 4 (full model) using mostly congruent and mostly
incongruent items within the list-wide PC 50 condition in Gonthier et al. (2016). No intercept
correction was applied. The original scale of trial distance is displayed on the x-axis.
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Figure 12. Estimates of the CAWs in Model 4 (full model) using mostly congruent and mostly
incongruent items within PC 50 lists from Bugg & Dey (2018). Each condition is plotted after
subtracting its intercept. The original scale of trial distance is displayed on the x-axis.
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Figure 13. Estimates of the CAWs in Model 4 (full model) using mostly congruent and mostly
incongruent items within PC 50 lists from Bugg & Dey (2018). No intercept correction was
applied. The original scale of trial distance is displayed on the x-axis.
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Table 1
Gonthier et al. (2017) List-Wide Proportion Congruence Model Comparisons
Model

Test

Χ2

p

-3986

1 vs. 0

99.19

<.001

8058

-4024

2 vs. 0

22.46

<.001

7961

-3974

3 vs. 1

23.04

<.001

3 vs. 2

99.77

<.001

4 vs. 3

5.40

0.067

df

AIC

log lik.

0. Intercept

3

8077

-4036

1. Log trial distance

4

7980

2. Condition

5

3. Log trial distance + Condition

6

4. Log trial distance + Condition
+ Log trial distance x Condition

8

7960

-3971

Note. AIC = Akaike Information criterion; log lik. = log likelihood.
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Table 2
Gonthier et al. (2017) List-Wide Proportion Congruence Full Model Coefficients
Variable

B (SE)

t

(Intercept)

-.09 (.02)

-4.74

Log trial distance

.16 (.02)

6.62

LWMC condition

-.09 (.03)

-3.67

LWMI condition

.01 (.03)

.26

Log trial distance x LWMC condition

.01 (.03)

.19

Log trial distance x LWMI condition

-.06 (.03)

-1.91

Note. LWMC = list-wide mostly congruent; LWMI = list-wide mostly incongruent.
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Table 3.
Gourley et al. (2016) List-Wide Proportion Congruence Model Comparisons
Model

Test

Χ2

p

-2985

1 vs. 0

127.48

<.001

6095

-3042

2 vs. 0

12.44

.002

5969

-2978

3 vs. 1

13.18

.001

3 vs. 2

128.22

<.001

4 vs. 3

19.74

<.001

df

AIC

log lik.

0. Intercept

3

6103

-3049

1. Log trial distance

4

5978

2. Condition

5

3. Log trial distance + Condition

6

4. Log trial distance + Condition
+ Log trial distance x Condition

8

5953

-2969

Note. AIC = Akaike Information criterion; log lik. = log likelihood.
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Table 4.
Gourley et al. (2016) List-Wide Proportion Congruence Full Model Coefficients
Variable

B (SE)

t

(Intercept)

-.32 (.03)

-9.89

Log trial distance

.46 (.05)

9.72

LWMC condition

.02 (.04)

.382

LWMI condition

.13 (.04)

2.99

Log trial distance x LWMC condition

-.14 (.07)

-2.04

Log trial distance x LWMI condition

-.30 (.07)

-4.45

Note. LWMC = list-wide mostly congruent; LWMI = list-wide mostly incongruent.
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Table 5.
Gonthier et al. (2016) Item-Specific Proportion Congruence Model Comparison
Model

Test

Χ2

p

-1759

1 vs. 0

5.63

.018

3527

-1760

2 vs. 0

3.69

.054

3523

-1757

3 vs. 1

3.71

.054

3 vs. 2

5.64

.017

4 vs. 3

.48

.488

df

AIC

log lik.

0. Intercept

3

3529

-1762

1. Log instance distance

4

3525

2. Item type

4

3. Log trial distance + Condition

5

4. Log trial distance + Condition
+ Log trial distance x Condition

6

3525

-1757

Note. AIC = Akaike Information criterion; log lik. = log likelihood.
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Table 6.
Gonthier et al. (2016) Item-specific Proportion Congruence Full Model Coefficients
Variable

B (SE)

t

(Intercept)

-.19 (.06)

-3.22

Log instance distance

.19 (.09)

2.17

MI item

.15 (.08)

1.93

Log instance distance x MI item

-.08 (.13)

-.69

Note. MI = mostly incongruent. Mostly congruent items were used as the reference group.
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Table 7.
Bugg & Dey (2018) Item-specific Proportion Congruence Model Comparisons
Model

Test

Χ2

p

-3639

1 vs. 0

35.94

<.001

7322

-3657

2 vs. 0

.24

.618

7288

-3639

3 vs. 1

.25

.615

3 vs. 2

35.94

<.001

4 vs. 3

.41

.522

df

AIC

log lik.

0. Intercept

3

7320

-3657

1. Log instance distance

4

7287

2. Item type

4

3. Log trial distance + Condition

5

4. Log trial distance + Condition
+ Log trial distance x Condition

6

7290

-3639

Note. AIC = Akaike Information criterion; log lik. = log likelihood.
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Table 8.
Bugg & Dey (2018) Item-Specific Full Model Coefficients
Variable

B (SE)

t

(Intercept)

-.17 (.03)

-5.50

Log instance distance

.17 (.04)

3.80

MI item

.02 (.04)

.51

Log instance distance x MI item

.04 (.06)

.64

Note. MI = mostly incongruent. Mostly congruent items were used as the reference group.
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